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We study annual general meetings of shareholders in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
corporate governance system is characterized by relatively concentrated shareholdings 
and large stakes owned by pension funds, banks and insurance companies. The legal 
protection of shareholders is poor due to takeover defenses, such as certificates, which 
deprive shareholders from their voting rights. An analysis of the minutes of 245 
general meetings in the period 1998-2002 reveals that about 30% of the shareholders 
is present at the meeting. This is low in comparison with shareholder turn-out in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Management sponsors all proposals at the meeting and only 9 
out of 1,583 proposals are rejected or withdrawn. Multivariate analyses of the 
incidence and extent of voting against a proposal show that firm size and the type of 
proposal are important determinants. Overall, our findings suggest that shareholders 




The reason that investors are willing to provide equity financing to a firm is that they 
receive control rights in exchange. These control rights allow shareholders to vote on 
important corporate matters, such as mergers and the election of management. In the 
corporate governance literature much attention is devoted to the identity and 
concentration of the shareholders, i.e. the firm’s ownership structure (for a review, see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Many studies investigate the role in corporate governance 
of large shareholders and specific shareholders, such as financial institutions. 
However, the mechanisms that shareholders use to exercise the control, have received 
little attention. An important forum for shareholders to exercise their control rights is 
the yearly general meeting of shareholders. In this study we investigate voting 
behavior at the general meeting.  
The general meeting serves to enable shareholders to hold the directors of a 
company accountable for their actions. As such it is an integral part of a corporate 
governance system of checks and balances to control agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). General meetings have three important functions (Strätling, 2003). 
The first is to inform shareholders about the financial performance of the company. 
The second is to gain the approval of the shareholders for decisions that are outside 
the authority of the board of directors such as the adoption of the annual accounts and 
discharge of board members. The third function is to provide a forum for discussions 
between directors and shareholders.  
In this paper, we study 245 annual general meetings held by 54 Dutch listed 
firms in the 1998-2002 period. The Netherlands is a typical case of a Continental 
European country with poor legal protection of small shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). To our knowledge, there is no study 
investigating general meetings in a European country.  The focus of the existing 
literature has been on shareholder activism in the United States. These studies offer 
mixed evidence of value increases from shareholder governance proposals at the 
general meeting when measured by short-term stock price reactions and/or long-term 
performance (Wahal, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; Karpoff, Maletesta 
and Walking, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Prevost 
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and Rao, 2000)1. Romano (2001) argues that activist institutions should therefore 
reassess their agendas to use their resources more effectively. However, some pension 
funds such as CalPERs and TIAA-CREF, have been able to successfully influence 
corporate governance outside the general meeting through private negotiations with 
management (Smith, 1996; Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 1998). 
There are three important institutional differences between the United States 
and the Netherlands that make our study interesting: the role of private pension funds, 
the use of takeover defenses and the two-tier board structure. In the United States, 
private pension funds are legally required to vote their shares at general meetings 
under the prudent man rule of the Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974 (Mallin, 
2001). In the Netherlands, no such voting requirement currently exists. Dutch pension 
funds own large equity stakes in companies but are free to choose whether or not they 
vote their shares. This presents a different institutional setting in which pension fund 
activism can be studied.  
The second institutional difference between the Netherlands and the United 
States is that Dutch companies frequently limit shareholders’ rights. These limitations 
are normally referred to as takeover defenses. However, most defenses in Dutch firms 
limit shareholder rights also when there is no takeover threat. The most relevant 
takeover defense is the use of share certificates. The company may create these 
certificates by depositing the original voting shares with a trust office. For every 
deposited share the trust office then issues a certificate of a common share that is 
traded on Euronext Amsterdam. The voting right remains with the trust office, which 
is often friendly to incumbent management. This implies that in a subset of Dutch 
companies, shareholders are deprived of their votes at the general meeting, which are 
not cancelled but cast by the trust office. In the United States, it is illegal to separate 
shares of their voting rights although it is possible for a certain class of shares to have 
superior voting rights to another class of shares in a dual class capitalization. We 
analyze the impact of the certificates on voting outcomes.  
Third, Dutch companies have a two-tier board structure. The management 
board consists of executive directors and is entrusted with the day-to-day management 
                                                           
1 Under SEC rule 14A-8 shareholders can make proposals to change corporate governance structures. 
These proposals can be up to 500 words in length and management must include these proposals in the 
proxy material. Under relevant state corporate law, these proposals are advisory and not binding 
(Gordon and Pound, 1993). We refer to Romano (2001) for a survey on institutional investors’ activism 
in the United States. 
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of the company. A Dutch company’s supervisory board consists of non-executive 
directors and is responsible for supervising the policy pursued by the management 
board. In performing their duties, the supervisory board members are required by 
Dutch company law to act in the interests of the company as a whole, and not 
primarily or exclusively in the interests of shareholders or other groups of 
stakeholders. The supervisory board acts as a delegated monitor of stakeholders. This 
two-tier board structure is also common in other countries, such as Germany and 
Denmark. In a subset of Dutch companies several shareholders’ decision rights are 
transferred from the general meeting to this supervisory board such as the 
appointment of board members.  
The paper continues as follows. Section two discusses the institutional 
background. This section also includes a discussion of takeover defenses that limit 
shareholders’ influence at the general meeting. The third section develops hypotheses. 
In section four we present our data. Section five discusses our empirical results. 
Section six concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
General meetings in the Netherlands have to be held within six months after the end 
of the financial year for the purpose of, among other things, the  adoption of the 
annual accounts and the discharge of management board members and supervisory 
board members from liability regarding the duties performed by them during the 
financial year. Each year there should be at least one general meeting (Section 108 of 
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). Each shareholder is entitled to attend general 
meetings, either in person or through a written proxy, to speak at such meetings and to 
exercise his voting rights (Section 118 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). All holders 
of registered shares must get a 15 days’ notice of the meeting sent to their addresses. 
Holders of bearer shares and certificates must be given notice by placing an 
announcement in a nation-wide distributed newspaper (Section 115 of Book 2 of the 
Dutch Civil Code). An ownership record is made no earlier than 7 days before the date 
of the general meeting (Section 1999 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). Only 
shareholders according to the ownership record are entitled to vote. The board must 
give the shareholders all information they ask for at the general meeting, unless it is of 
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vital importance to the company to withhold the information (Section 107 of Book 2 of 
the Dutch Civil Code). Generally, this provision is understood to oblige the boards to 
respond to questions of individual shareholders at the meeting (Meinema, 2002).  
Typically, all proposals at the general meeting pass by a simple majority of 
votes (>50%), unless Dutch corporate law or the company’s articles of association 
require a larger majority. According to the articles of association of most Dutch  
companies, shareholders that own more than 1% of the shares can also submit 
proposals to vote on at the general meeting. However, certain proposals can only be 
adopted upon a proposal of the management or the supervisory board. Examples are 
proposals to amend the articles of association, to dissolve the company, to issue shares 
or to grant rights to subscribe for shares, to limit or exclude any pre-emptive rights 
and to approve or authorize the management board to sell all or substantially all of the 
company’s assets.  
 
2.1. Proposals  at the general meeting 
The general meeting typically decides, among others, on the following matters :  
 
i.   Adoption of annual accounts and discharge 
The general meeting adopts the annual accounts (Section 101 of Book 2 of the Dutch 
Civil Code). Unconditional adoption of the annual accounts by the general meeting 
normally implies a discharge of management board members and supervisory board 
members from liability for the performance of their duties. Under Dutch law, this 
discharge is not absolute and is not effective as to matters not disclosed at the 
shareholders meeting. Since 2001 Dutch companies are legally required to separate 
the adoption of annual accounts and the discharge from liability into two (sub-) 
proposals at the general meeting.  
ii. Distribution of profits 
The management board, subject to the approval of the supervisory board, determines 
the proportion of company profits that is to be retained. The remaining profits are at 
the disposal of the general meeting, which has to approve of the distribution of profits 
that is proposed by the management board (Section 105 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil 
Code). 
iii. Issue of shares and pre-emptive rights 
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The general meeting has the power to issue shares and to determine the price and 
further terms and conditions of each issue of shares. They may delegate this power to 
another corporate body that will have the exclusive power to issue shares following 
such a delegation2. This delegation is valid for a period of up to five years (Section 96 
of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). Each shareholder has a pre-emptive right to 
subscribe for new shares in proportion to the number of shares held. However, the 
general meeting has the power to limit or exclude any pre-emptive rights of 
shareholders and may delegate such authority to another corporate body (Section 96a 
of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). The resolution to limit or exclude any pre-
emptive rights legally requires a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes cast in a 
meeting of shareholders if less than 50% of the issued share capital is present or 
represented, and a normal majority otherwise. 
iv. Share repurchase 
The general meeting can also authorize another corporate body to repurchase shares 
(Section 98 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). This authorization is for a period of 
up to 18 months and includes references to the maximum shares to be acquired, the 
manner in which such acquisition may take place and the acquisition price range. 
v. Amendments to articles of association 
In principle, the general meeting has the powers to amend the articles of association of 
the company (Section 121 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). However, the articles 
of association of the company may contain provisions that limit the ability of the 
general meeting to amend the articles of association. These provisions can only be 
amended through a unanimous decision at a general meeting where all of the issued 
share capital is present or represented.  
vi. Reduction of share capital 
The general meeting may resolve, subject to the relevant provisions of Dutch law and 
the articles of association, to reduce the outstanding share capital by canceling shares 
through an amendment of the articles of association. A resolution to reduce the share 
capital legally requires a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes cast in a meeting 
of shareholders if less than 50% of the issued share capital is present or represented  
(Section 99 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). 
                                                           
2 Corporate bodies include the general meeting, a priority shareholders’ meeting, the management board, 
the supervisory board and the joint meeting of the management and supervisory board (Sections 78a and 
189a of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). 
 8
vii. Appointment of an external accountant 
A Dutch company has to be audited by an external accountant (Section 393 of Book 2 
of the Dutch Civil Code). The accountant submits the outcome of his investigation to 
the corporate body, which is to adopt the account. The general meeting may appoint the 
external accountant.  
viii. Remuneration of supervisory board members 
Legally the general meeting decides on the remuneration of management board 
members and supervisory board members (Section 135 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil 
Code) unless the company’s articles of association state otherwise. In law practice, the 
general meeting determines the remuneration of supervisory board members whereas 
the supervisory board usually determines the remuneration and further terms of 
employment of each member of the management board. 
ix. Appointment, suspension and dismissal of board members 
In principle, the general meeting decides on the appointment, suspension and 
dismissal of management board members and supervisory board members (Sections 
132 and 134 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). A subset of Dutch companies is 
subject to the structured regime as defined in Sections 158 to 164 of Book 2 of the 
Dutch Civil Code that transfers decision power from the general meeting to the 
supervisory board3. Any company operating under the structured regime is required to 
have a supervisory board whose mandate includes the adoption of the annual 
accounts, the appointment and dismissal of the members of the supervisory board, the 
appointment and dismissal of the members of the management board and the approval 
of specific resolutions of the management board4.  
 
 
                                                           
3 The structured regime is legally required for Dutch companies that meet the following three 
conditions over a consecutive three year period: (1) a book value of equity in excess of €13 million, (2) 
a workers council and (3) at least 100 people employed in the Netherlands (Meinema, 2002). 
4 In the event of a vacancy for a supervisory board position under the structured regime, the general 
meeting, the works council and the supervisory board may each put forward a non-binding nomination 
for a candidate for the position. The general meeting and works council may each lodge an objection to 
the proposed appointment of a supervisory board member. Appointment may nevertheless carry 
through if the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal dismisses these objections. Each 
member of the management board may be suspended or removed at any time by the supervisory board, 
provided that the general meeting of shareholders is consulted before such removal. Under the 
structured regime members of the supervisory board can only be dismissed by the Enterprise Chamber 




2.2. Takeover defenses 
Dutch companies may decide to limit the influence of their shareholders at the general 
meeting  by adopting one or more takeover defenses (De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and 
Wasley, 2004). These takeover defenses include:  
 
i. Certificates 
Dutch law does not recognize shares without voting rights (Meinema, 2002). The law 
practice has created share certificates instead. A trust office administers the certificates 
when issued or initiates a certification process where certificates are exchanged for 
ordinary shares. The trust office is comprised of members from the company 
(supervisory board and management board) and outsiders (not from the company).  
While the chairman and majority of the trust office members must be outsiders, in 
practice, the trust office is always friendly to existing management.  The trust office is 
given responsibility for the ordinary shares associated with the certificates. Through 
the process of certification, legal, but not “economic” ownership of the ordinary 
shares is transferred to the trust office (Slagter, 1996, p.210).  Certificate holders have 
dividend rights, can freely trade their certificates and can attend the general meeting, 
but they cannot vote (Sections 117 and 118 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). The 
trust office holds all voting rights including approval of the dividend policy. The 
prevailing type of certificate is the limited exchangeable certificate.  Once issued, 
these certificates can be exchanged for ordinary shares up to a maximum percentage 
of 1% of outstanding share capital.  However, once exchanged for ordinary shares, 
holders lose trading privileges for the exchanged shares.  Ordinary shares can be 
reconverted to certificates, but then voting rights are lost. 
ii. Priority shares 
Priority shares confer special voting privileges to foundations friendly to the 
management board. The holders of priority shares have special rights in situations 
such as merger approval, the payment of dividends, new public offerings, 
amendments to the articles of association and company liquidation. The priority – a 
corporate body that consist of the holders of priority shares – typically also has the 
right to nominate and discharge management and supervisory board members. Priority 
shares are not traded on the stock exchange.   
iii. Preference shares 
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The most common takeover defense is “protective preference shares”.  Management 
can issue such shares to a friendly trust office or outside investor during a hostile 
takeover threat.  Preference shares are sold at nominal value to the trust office or 
friendly investor with an obligation to pay only 25% of the amount up front. 
Preference shares have voting rights at the general meeting and are restricted to a 
maximum of 50% or 100% of the current outstanding nominal capital depending on 
the other takeover defenses the company has adopted. Because preference shares get 
the same voting rights as ordinary shares, substantial voting power can be given to a 
friendly party at a relatively low cost.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
In this section, we develop five testable hypotheses. We start with pension fund 
activism. Several studies examine the role of pension funds in the United States (Del 
Guericio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Prevost and Rao, 2000) These 
studies report that pension funds often attend the general meetings of US companies 
and submit corporate governance proposals. Dutch pension funds own large equity 
stakes in companies and are expected to exercise their votes. However, they are free 
to choose whether or not they vote their shares.5 Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership of pension funds is positively related to opposition against a 
management proposal. 
 
Romano (2003) argues that institutional investors such as banks and insurance 
companies may have conflicts of interest that prevent them from voting against 
management proposals even if this would benefit the value of their shares. This 
argument is particularly relevant in the Netherlands where a small number of large 
banks and insurance companies are not only important shareholders in Dutch listed 
                                                           
5 Dutch occupational pensions are defined benefit pensions that guarantee 70% of the last earned 
salary. Because the pensions are capital funded, several funds have relatively large portfolios. For 
example, ABP, a fund for civil servants, has an assets size of € 150 billion  and PGGM (health care 
fund) has total assets of  €53 billion (over 2000, source: Compendium Nederlands Bedrijfsleven 2001). 
Issues in corporate governance are of interest to these funds and eight large pension funds have 
founded Stichting Corporate Governance Onderzoek Pensioenfondsen (SCGOP) in 1998. This 
foundation aims to enhance research on governance by pension funds.  
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companies, but also sell financial services to these same firms6. This conflict of 
interest may prevent them to vote against management proposals at the general 
meeting (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Pound, 1988)  We hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ownership of banks and insurance companies is negatively related to 
the opposition against a management proposal.  
 
In the Netherlands, there are several opportunities for firms to limit the 
influence of their shareholders at the general meeting (see section 2). Certificates 
deprive individual shareholders of their voting rights and are expected to influence 
voting outcomes. Certificate holders have dividend rights, can freely trade their 
certificates and can attend the general meeting, but they cannot vote.7 The trust office 
casts their votes at the general meeting. This trust office is typically aligned with 
management and not expected to vote against management proposals. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 3: The use of certificates is negatively related to the opposition against a 
management proposal. 
 
Gordon and Pound (1993) show that shareholder-sponsored corporate 
governance proposals receive more votes at general meetings when long-run stock 
price performance has been poor and current valuation ratios are low. Shareholders 
might show their discontent about poor firm performance by voting against proposals 
at the general meeting.  This predicts an inverse relation between the likelihood and 
percentage of votes against a proposal and firm performance.  We therefore 
hypothesize:  
  
Hypothesis 4: Past firm performance is negatively related to the opposition against a 
management proposal.  
 
                                                           
6 The three large banks and insurers (ABN Amro, Fortis and ING) have a 91.8 percent market share in 
the financial services industry (over 2000, source: Compendium Nederlands Bedrijfsleven 2001). 
7 Recently, some firms allow certificate holders to register their certificates and temporarily transform 
the certificates into shares during the shareholders meeting, allowing certificate holders to vote. So far, 
certificate holders make very limited use of this right. 
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Romano (2003) reports that voting outcomes are best explained by proposal 
type. Gordon and Pound (1993) and Gillan and Starks (2000) show that shareholder-
sponsored corporate governance proposals receive more votes at general meetings 
when they reinstate shareholders’ voting rights. Similarly, we predict that 
shareholders will be likely to vote against a proposal that directly relates to their 
rights. In particular, we hypothesize that proposals to authorize the management board 
to issue equity and to limit or exclude the pre-emptive rights of shareholders will lead 
to most opposition at the general meeting. These pre-emptive rights are part of the 
legal protection of minority shareholders. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) mention the pre-emptive right of minority shareholders to 
participate in new equity issues at the same conditions as the controlling owner as one 
of the legal determinants of external finance. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 5: Shareholders are more likely to oppose the proposal to authorize the 
management board to issue new equity and to limit or exclude pre-emptive rights. 
 
 
4. Sample description 
 
Our sample consists of the 54 largest Dutch listed companies that were constituents of 
the AEX index or AMX index at any time during the period 1998-2002. We obtain 
the minutes of 245 the general meetings held by our sample firms from the companies 
or from the Vereniging van Effectenbezitters (the Dutch Shareholders’ Association). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the 245 general meetings. We start with the 
sample characteristics. The average market capitalization equals €10.8 billion. The 
average market-to-book ratio is 1.9 and the average return on equity (ROE), defined 
as net profits divided by the book value of equity, equals 31.1 percent. Market 
capitalization, market-to-book ratio and return on equity are all measured at the end of 
the year preceding the general meeting. For example, when the general meeting is 
held in April 1998, we measure these variables at year-end 1997. 
We find that the ownership structure of the sample firms is relatively 
concentrated. The largest outside blockholder owns 14.3 percent of the shares, on 
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average8. All outside blockholders together own 26.9 percent of the firm’s shares. 
Pension funds are relatively important shareholders and own 10 percent of shares on 
average. The percentage of shares held by banks and insurance companies equals 7.8 
percent and 2.7 percent, respectively.  
Table 1 also shows that most Dutch firms adopt takeover defenses. Preference 
shares are most popular with 71 percent of observations using this antitakeover 
measure. The structured regime is present in 57 percent of our sample firms. Priority 
shares and certificates are used by 36 percent and 30 percent of observations, 
respectively.  
 
[Please insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
 Table 2 provides information on the shareholder turn-out at the general 
meeting in Panel A. We distinguish between the companies that use certificates and 
those that do not. We find that the average percentage of share capital that is 
represented at the general meeting is 90 percent or higher in most years for the 
companies that adopt certificates. This is not surprising because representatives of the 
trust office always attend the general meeting and represent the certificate holders. 
The average shareholder turn-out for the companies without certificates is much lower 
at around 30 percent in most years. The turn-out for Dutch general meetings is 
substantially below the turn-out of 82.2 percent reported for the United States (Maug 
and Rydqvist, 2001).  
 Panel B of Table 2 shows that pension funds attend 35% of the general 
meetings. However, the number of meetings that pension funds visit has declined over 
the sample period. Mutual funds and other institutional investors (mainly banks and 
insurance companies) do not frequently attend general meetings and do not vote 
against proposals (respectively 8% and 3%).9 We should note that attendance at 
                                                           
8 The 1996 Act on Disclosure of Holdings in Listed Companies, provides that any person, who directly 
or indirectly, acquires or disposes of an interest in the capital and/or the voting rights of public limited 
liability company incorporated under Dutch law with an official listing on a stock exchange, must give 
a written notice of such acquisition or disposal, if as a result of such acquisition or disposal the 
percentage of capital interest or voting rights held by such person falls within another percentage range 
held by such person prior to the acquisition or disposal. The relevant percentage ranges referred to in 
the Disclosure of Holdings Act are 0% to 5%; 5% to 10%; 10% to 25%; 25% to 50%; 50% to 66⅔%; 
and over 66⅔%. 
 
9 Table 1 showed that 42% of the firms have a pension fund as one of the blockholders, while the 
corresponding percentages are 59% and 16% for banks and insurers.  
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meetings is based on the minutes of the general meeting. It is possible that 
shareholders were present but if the minutes of the meeting do not mention them we 
could not identify these shareholders. These statistics are therefore a lower bound on 
the attendance by institutional investors.   
     
    [Please insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
 Table 3 reports that the median number of proposals at the general meetings 
equals six. The total number of proposals during the years 1998-2002 is 1,583. 
According to the articles of association of most Dutch companies, shareholders that 
own more than 1% of the shares can also submit proposals to the general meeting. 
However, during our sample period there are no shareholder-sponsored proposals. 
This implies that management sponsors all 1,583 proposals.  
 Over the entire sample period, 601 proposals (38 percent of all management 
proposals) have received at least one vote against. We know the exact percentage of 
votes against the proposal for 487 of these proposals. We observe that the fraction of 
proposals with votes against increases from 23.1 percent in 1998 to 49.4 percent in 
2002. We also report that institutional investors generally do not vote against 
proposals. However, the number of proposals voted against is increasing for pension 
funds.  
 Table 4 gives a detailed overview of the different types of proposals. The table 
reports the number of proposals, the fraction of those proposals that received votes 
against and the conditional average percentage of votes against. We refer to Section 2 
for a description of the various proposals. For example, in 1998 there were 48 
proposals concerning the adoption of annual accounts of which 12.5 percent (6 
proposals) received votes against. The percentage of votes against is available for 5 
proposals (between brackets in the table) and averages 0.10%. Table 4 shows that the 
proposals to authorize the management board to issue shares and the proposal to limit 
or exclude the pre-emptive rights attract most votes against.  
The percentage of votes against proposals is typically not large enough to 
prevent the management proposal from passing. Proposals are rarely rejected at the 
general meeting. During the sample period there were only nine out of 1,583 
proposals that got rejected or withdrawn. Six of these nine proposals that are rejected 
or withdrawn concern the authorization to issue equity and to limit or exclude pre-
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emptive rights. This shows that nearly all management proposals pass at the general 
meeting. This corresponds to the U.S. findings of Maug and Rydqvist (2001). They 
report that shareholder-sponsored proposals often fail to get majority support at 
general meetings whereas management-sponsored proposals always pass. The next 





Table 5 shows our regression results. We use two measures for opposition against a 
management proposal: the likelihood of votes against a proposal and the percentage of 
votes against a proposal. In Columns 1 to 3 we estimate a logit regression. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value one if at least one shareholder 
votes against the proposal and zero otherwise. In this analysis we exclude 69 
proposals at which one or more shareholders withheld votes (but no other shareholder 
voted against the proposal) and 7 proposals with missing information on the voting 
outcome. This leaves 1,507 proposals of which 597 proposals (39.6% of total) 
received votes against and the remaining 910 proposals did not. 
 We include year dummies in the logit model to identify a possible trend. We 
observe that the probability of votes against a proposal increases in the years 2000, 
2001 and 2002 compared to the reference year 1998. The probability of votes against 
has therefore increased over time.  Market capitalization of the company is included 
as a control variable. Proposals are more likely to receive at least one vote against for 
larger companies. This can easily be understood because larger companies tend to 
have more dispersed ownership, which increases the chance of one of the many 
shareholders voting against a proposal. 
To test hypothesis 1, we include the percentage of shares owned by pension 
funds. Inconsistent with this hypothesis, we report that the likelihood of votes against 
a proposal is lower when pension funds own more shares in the company. This 
suggests that these pension funds show any discontent with management in private 
meetings and not at the general meeting.10 This finding adds to the results of Smith 
                                                           
10 In an unreported additional regression we interacted the shareholdings by pension funds with the five 
year dummies. All five coefficients are negative and three coefficients (1998, 2001 and 2002) are 
significant at the 10% level. 
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(1996) and Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998). They show that U.S. pension 
funds are able to reach agreements with targeted companies without shareholders 
voting on the proposal at the general meeting.  
Model (1) shows that bank shareholdings are not significantly related to the 
likelihood of votes against a proposal. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 2. 
However, we do find that the likelihood of votes against a proposal is lower when 
insurance companies own shares in the company. This is consistent with hypothesis 2 
and suggests that potential conflicts of interests may affect the voting behavior of 
insurance companies. We also include the stock ownership of the largest outside 
shareholder in our model. We find that this has a positive influence on the likelihood 
of votes against a proposal. Large shareholders are less subject to the free-rider 
problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). It is less costly for them to collect information 
on firm performance and to attend the general meeting than for minority shareholders. 
Model (1) also includes dummies for the different types of proposals that are 
voted on. We have grouped some related proposals together such as the adoption of 
annual accounts/discharge and the proposal to authorize the management board to 
issue new shares/to limit or exclude the pre-emptive right. We consolidate these 
proposals into one group because they are typically packaged proposals at the general 
meeting. The results support hypothesis 5. The proposal to authorize the management 
board to issue new shares and to limit or exclude pre-emptive rights is more likely to 
be voted against than other proposals. This is consistent with the idea that 
shareholders will be more likely to vote against proposals to waive their legal pre-
emptive rights. 
In Model (2) we remove the dummy for proposals to amend the articles of 
association and bank shareholdings (that were insignificant in Model (1)) and add 
dummy variables for the various types of takeover defenses. Consistent with 
hypothesis 3 we find that certificates reduce the likelihood of votes against a proposal. 
The reason is that the trust office casts the votes at the general meeting and the 
administrators of the trust office are often on friendly terms with management. We 
also find that the likelihood of votes against a proposal is lower when the firm uses 
priority shares or is legally required to apply the structured regime. These takeover 
defenses transfer some of the key decision rights - such as the appointment of board 
members from the general meeting - to a foundation (priority shares) or the 
supervisory board (structured regime). The coefficient on the dummy for preference 
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shares is significantly positive. This is a puzzling result since we would have expected 
that these preference shares would not affect voting behavior. Protective preference 
shares are only issued at the threat of a hostile takeover and therefore not outstanding 
in most of the sample companies.   
Model (3) adds the performance variables. We use one accounting (return on 
equity) and one stock market based performance (market-to-book ratio) measure.  We 
find that firms with valuable growth opportunities, as reflected in a higher market-to-
book ratio, have a lower probability of votes against a proposal at the general meeting. 
This finding is consistent with hypothesis 4. However, we do not find a relationship 
between the return on equity and the likelihood of votes against a proposal.  
Next, we examine the percentage of votes against a proposal using OLS 
regressions. We examine only those proposals that have received one or more votes 
against. Based on the available information we can compute the percentage of votes 
against for 487 proposals. We drop five observations because of missing information 
on other variables. This leaves 482 proposals for our analysis. 
We use the same set of explanatory variables as before. Model (4) shows that 
the percentage of votes against is increasing over time and is higher in 2001 and 2002 
than it was in 1998. Market capitalization is inversely related to the percentage of 
votes against a proposal. A plausible explanation is that wealth constraints are more 
important for larger firms. In larger firms it takes more money to own a significant 
stake in the company. As a result ownership is more dispersed and it is less likely that 
there will be a high percentage of votes against a proposal at the general meeting. 
We find that pension funds have a negative effect on the percentage of votes 
against a proposal. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis 1, but consistent with 
our findings for the likelihood of votes against. We infer that pension funds do not 
show their discontent with management by voting against proposals. We also find that 
the percentage of votes against is lower when banks and insurance companies own 
shares in the company. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
This is inconsistent with hypotheses 2. The coefficient on the ownership of the largest 
shareholder is also insignificant. 
The dummies for the proposals are of similar sign and significance as with the 
probit analysis. We find that the proposal to issue new shares and to limit or exclude 
the pre-emptive rights of shareholders receives a higher percentage of votes against it 
in comparison to other proposals. This is consistent with hypothesis 5. Model (5) 
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removes the insignificant ownership variables and proposal dummies and adds the 
dummy variables for the takeover defenses. We find that certificates do not affect the 
percentage of votes against a proposal, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 3. 
However, the sample has relatively few firms with certificates, because model (2) 
already showed that certification reduces the incidence of votes against a proposal. 
We also report that priority shares and the structured regime are not significantly 
related to the percentage of votes against a proposal. The negative coefficient for 
preference shares is surprising but becomes insignificant in Model (6). In Model (6) 
we remove the insignificant dummy variables for the different types of takeover 
defenses. We add the performance variables. Inconsistent with hypothesis 4, we do 
not find a negative relationship between the percentage of votes against and firm 
performance. Instead, there is even a positive relation between the percentage of votes 





In this paper we have examined the voting behavior of shareholders at the general 
meeting in the Netherlands. The Netherlands exemplifies Continental European 
countries with poor legal protection of shareholders and therefore presents a different 
institutional setting to existing studies that have primarily focused on the United 
States.  
 We observe that the shareholder turn-out in the Netherlands is relatively low. 
The average turn-out for companies without certificates is around 30 percent whereas 
the average turn-out is 82.2 percent in the United States (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001) 
and 45 percent in the United Kingdom (Strätling, 2003).  We examine the 
determinants of the likelihood of at least one shareholder voting against a proposal as 
well as the determinants of the percentage of votes against a proposal. We find that 
pension fund ownership decreases the likelihood of votes against a proposal and the 
                                                           
11 We ran additional tests and interacted return on equity with each of the proposal dummies (not 
tabulated). When we add the interaction term between the return on equity and the dummy for the 
proposal to amend the articles of association, we observe a coefficient of 9.62 with a t-value of 5.09 
while the coefficient on return on equity equals 1.76 and becomes insignificant (t-value=1.47). This 
shows that the positive relation between the percentage of votes against and return on equity is largely 
driven by the 30 proposals to amend the articles of association. 
 
 19
percentage of votes cast against a proposal. This suggests that pension funds are less 
active at general meetings than might be expected. This finding is consistent with 
other studies. Institutional investors also favor exerting influence on management 
outside the general meetings in the United Kingdom (Short and Keasey, 1999) and the 
United States (Smith, 1996; Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 1998).  
 There is no support for the hypothesis that conflicts of interest drive the voting 
behavior of banks and insurance companies at general meetings. However, we do find 
that the ownership of insurance companies is negatively related to the likelihood of 
votes against a proposal. We find strong evidence that certificates reduce the 
likelihood of votes against a proposal. Certificate holders are not entitled to vote at the 
general meeting but trust office administrators cast the votes. This finding reflects that 
these administrators are often friendly to management.  
 We find weak support for the hypothesis that voting behavior is determined by 
financial performance. However, we find strong evidence that shareholders are more 
opposed to proposals that directly relate to their rights. In particular, we document that 
shareholders are more likely to vote against and there is a higher percentage of votes 
against proposals to authorize management to issue new shares and to limit or exclude 
pre-emptive rights.  
Currently, governance structures in the Netherlands are changing rapidly. First, 
Dutch Parliament has approved adjustments in the structured regime in September 
2003. The changes imply more shareholder influence in the appointment procedure of 
supervisory board members (Meinema, 2002). Moreover, the new legislation improves 
the voting rights for certificates in firms with and without the structured regime. 
Second, the Tabaksblat committee has proposed a code on corporate governance in 
December 2003. In its report, the committee proposes that management either 
complies with the code or explains at the general meeting why it deviates from the 
code (‘comply or explain rule’). Of course, it remains an empirical question whether 
the current changes have the desired effect, i.e. whether shareholder monitoring and 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
N>0 
Market capitalization 10,844,957 1,707,237 21,297,182 245
Market-to-book ratio 1.914 1.470 1.482 245
Return on equity 0.311 0.185 1.076 245
Largest outside blockholder 14.33 9.00 14.94 227
All outside blockholders 26.87 23.46 20.38 227
Pension fund blockholdings 10.08 0.00 17.33 102
Bank blockholdings 7.75 5.31 8.72 144
Insurance company blockholdings 2.66 0.00 9.39 38
Dummy certificates 0.30 0 0.46 74
Dummy priority shares  0.36 0 0.48 89
Dummy preferred shares 0.71 1 0.46 173
Dummy structured regime 0.57 1 0.50 140
 
The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation and number of observations with value above zero 
for the 54 sample firms that held 245 annual general meetings. The number of observations is 245. Market 
capitalization is market value of equity. The market-to-book ratio is the market value (book value of total 
assets minus book value of equity plus market capitalization) divided by the book value of total assets. 
Return on  equity is net profits divided by book value of equity. Outside blockholdings are stakes of over 
5% not held by directors. The dummy variables for the presence of certificates, priority shares, preferred 
shares and structured regime have a value of one if these defenses are present, and zero otherwise. All 
variables are measured on December 31st or over the year preceding the meeting.  
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Table 2: Shareholder turn-out 
 
Panel A: Shareholder turn-out 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Percentage of share capital, certificates 
Average 89.83 88.15 94.06 92.82 94.03 
Median 97.76 97.34 98.62 97.26 98.41 
Number of companies 13 14 11 10 9 
Percentage of share capital, without certificates 
Average 31.86 36.51 33.52 31.00 33.17 
Median 26.63 33.25 37.50 30.42 33.96 
Number of companies 25 28 24 25 26 
Panel B: Identity of shareholders present 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Pension funds 22 20 15 11 17 
Mutual funds 3 4 5 3 5 
Other institutional investors 1 1 1 1 4 
Number of companies 48 52 49 48 48 
 
Panel A shows means and medians of the percentages of shareholder turn-out, as well as the number of 
observations per year. Panel B describes the number of meetings per year in which a specific type of 




Table 3: Number of proposals at general meeting 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Average number of proposals 6.31 5.77 6.49 7.25 6.54 
Median number of proposals 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 
Total number of proposals 303 300 318 348 314 
→Number of proposals with votes 
against 
70 81 127 168 155 
→Number of proposals of which we 
know the percentage of votes against  
50 59 97 140 141 
Number of proposals voted against by:      
Pension funds 3 1 1 10 7 
Mutual funds 0 0 0 0 1 
Other institutional investors 0 0 0 0 5 
 
The table shows the mean and median number of proposals per meeting for each of the five years in the 
first and second row. The total number of proposals per year in the third row is compared with the 
proposals with votes against in the fourth row. The fifth row contains the proposals with votes against of 
which the percentage of votes against can be measured. The last three rows contain the number of 
proposals on which pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional investors cast votes against. 
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Table 4: Voting on management proposals at general meeting 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Adoption of annual accounts      
    Number of proposals 48 51 49 48 48 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  12.50%  15.69% 20.41% 33.33% 35.42% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.10% [5] 0.12% [4] 0.14% [8] 0.37% [14] 3.05% [14] 
Discharge      
    Number of proposals 46 54 51 50 50 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  10.87% 16.67% 27.45% 52.00% 46.00% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.01% [3] 0.16% [6] 0.09% [12] 0.70% [24] 0.68% [19] 
Distribution of profits      
    Number of proposals 43 43 41 42 40 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  9.30%  11.63% 21.95% 35.71% 32.50% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.05% [3] 0.68% [3] 0.21% [7] 3.11% [12] 0.45% [12] 
Issue of shares      
    Number of proposals 30 34 32 42 41 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  70.00% 73.53% 87.50% 69.05% 80.49% 
    Average percentage of votes against  4.31% [15] 5.76% [20] 6.20% [20] 7.69% [23] 8.33% [31] 
Pre-emptive rights      
    Number of proposals 8 7 12 14 13 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  87.50% 85.71% 100.00% 85.71% 92.31% 
    Average percentage of votes against  9.36% [2] 5.73% [5] 4.94% [6] 9.92% [10] 8.42% [12] 
Share repurchase      
    Number of proposals 41 45 43 44 43 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  19.51% 24.44% 30.23% 45.45% 39.53% 
    Average percentage of votes against  1.04% [8] 2.24% [9] 1.15% [12] 1.11% [18] 4.23% [16] 
Amendments to articles of association      
    Number of proposals 21 12 23 24 10 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  23.28% 50.00% 56.52% 45.83% 70.00% 
    Average percentage of votes against  1.40% [5] 3.37% [4] 1.58% [8] 2.42% [8] 5.79% [7] 
Reduction of share capital      
    Number of proposals 4 5 2 5 4 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  25.00% 20.00% 50.00% 20.00% 25.00% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.00% [0] 0.00% [0] 0.01% [1] 0.00% [0] 0.04% [1] 
Appointment of an external accountant      
    Number of proposals 14 10 15 16 14 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  14.29% 20.00% 40.00% 25.00% 28.57% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.06% [2] 0.08% [2] 0.02% [6] 0.13% [4] 0.02% [4] 
Remuneration of supervisory board      
    Number of proposals 11 7 1 8 7 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  18.18% 28.57% 0.00% 37.50% 42.86% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.00% [0] 0.54% [2] 0.00% [0] 0.25% [3] 0.87% [2] 
Appointment supervisory board member      
    Number of proposals 21 15 18 25 21 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  14.29% 6.67% 33.33% 60.00% 42.86% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.00% [0] 0.00% [0] 0.02% [5] 0.64% [10] 0.23% [9] 
Appointment management board member      
    Number of proposals 5 8 8 12 12 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  40.00% 12.50% 37.50% 50.00% 67.00% 
    Average percentage of votes against  0.11% [2] 0.24% [1] 0.02% [3] 0.11% [4] 0.13% [8] 
Other proposals      
    Number of proposals 11 9 23 18 11 
    Percentage proposals with of votes against  36.36% 44.44% 52.17% 58,33 85,71 
    Average percentage of votes against  2.20% [4] 5.33% [3] 4.83% [9] 0.85% [10] 4.15% [6] 
The table shows the number of proposals and the percentage of these proposals with votes against per 
type of proposal and per year. The average percentage of votes against is included, with number of 
observations of which the percentage is known in brackets.  
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Table 5: Regression results 
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McFadden R2/adjusted R2 0.248 0.279 0.280 0.210 0.221 0.244 
Number of observations 1507 1507 1507 482 482 482 
 
The table shows regression analyses explaining voting behavior on proposals. Columns (1), (2) and (3) 
contain logit regressions in which the explained variable is a binary variable with a value of one in case of 
votes against a proposal and zero otherwise. Reported are the coefficient and the z-statistic in parentheses. 
The McFadden R2 measures the explanatory power of the logit models. Columns (4), (5) and (6) contain 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions in which the explained variables is the percentage of votes against the 
proposal. Reported are the coefficient and the White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic in 
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parentheses. The adjusted R2 measures the explanatory power of the OLS regressions. All regressions 
include an intercept and four year dummies. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 or dummy 
variables for specific types of proposals. ‘*’ indicates significance at the 10% level, ‘**’ at the 5% level, 
and ‘***’ at the 1% level. 
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